Godel’s Theorem
We didn’t do justice in class to section 6.2 of the class text, Decidablity of Logical Theories. So here’s the story.
A Logical Theory contains relations, variables, logical connectives, and quantifiers. The logical connectives are always AND, OR and NOT, and the quantifiers are always EXISTS and FORALL. These elements are combined into formulas in simple ways conforming a simple grammar. It is easy to tell what is a formula, because the grammar rules are simple. How simple? It must be decidable. In addition, there are axioms, which are formulas which are known to be a priori true.
For instance, the theory of addition would have a single relation PLUS, which given three numbers x, y and z, would be true if and only if x+y=z, at least that’s what we would picture in our minds. A model for a theory is a map of the relation to some “real world” example such that all the true relations and formulas in the theory are actually true in the real world. So the theory of addition would certainly be true in the model where the variables would take values in the integers, or naturals, and PLUS would agree with addition of integers.
The theory of addition would have axioms asserting the properties about the theory, such as the commutativity of addition, the existence and uniqueness of the sum, and (perhaps) of the zero element. These axioms would be chosen so that they capture accurately the properties of the common model. The axiom of commutativity would be:
- FORALL x, FORALL y, EXISTS z PLUS(x,y,z) AND PLUS(y,x,z)
It is possible for multiple models to exist. Addition over the integers has the same formal properties as addition over the integers mod N (except the set of elements is finite and there is no order relationship … neither of these is important to the theory), or addition over the reals (except that the reals have a continuum of elements, while the integers are denumerable - again this is not important to the theory).
The question is, is the set of all true formulas of the theory Turing Decidable? For some theories, it is, for others, it is not. For those, this means that there is no algorithmic method for deciding the truth of all propositions. Since Proof is an algorithmic method, this means that not all truths are provable.
If we restrict to a theory modeled by the integers and addition, this is decidable. However, if we consider a theory modeled by the integers, addition and multiplication (called the language of Number Theory), this is not decidable. Because, given a description of a Turing Machine M, and an input w, it is possible to write down a formula in the language of integers, addition and multiplication, such that the formula is true if and only if M accepts w.
It’s a bit of a trick to do this, but in a certain way, I’m not surprised. The amount of brains needed to run a Turing Machine (move left, move right, write a zero, write a one) doesn’t seem to be more than what’s needed to solve integer formulas! And indeed, it isn’t.
The set of true formulas is, however, Turing acceptible. The true formulas are those true because they are axioms, or are relations, or are formulas whose truth is entailed by logical consequence from the axioms and relations. Such truth formulas will be true in any model of the theory. It is possible that certain formulas will be true in some models and not others. This occurs when essential axioms are removed. For instance, a theory of geometry with the parallel postulate removed. Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries are models for the neutral theory.
Not withstanding that, it is possible to write down the entailment rules so that a diligent Turing Machine can apply the entailment rules to the axioms and grind out many true formulas, and these are called theorems, and the grinding process is called proof. Rather un-poetic, but there you have it.
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